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1. INTRODUCTION
The 11-S and 11-M attacks in New York and Madrid and the murder of Theo
van Gogh in Amsterdam have raised many questions concerning the
position of information of the intelligence services and concerning the
possible use by them of coercive measures for the prevention and repression
of terrorist offences. In many countries, the events have led to a tide of
criminal law legislation to restrain terrorism. This is not only the case in the
US, with its USA Patriot Act,3 but also in the Netherlands.4 In 2004
substantive criminal law was adjusted in the Netherlands by means of the
Terrorist Offences Act [Wet Terroristische Misdrijven5], partly to implement
the EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. At the end of 2004, a
legislative proposal was submitted to extend the possibilities for
investigating and prosecuting terrorist offences.6 
The criminal prosecution of terrorism and guaranteeing security in a state
under the rule of law give rise to fundamental questions concerning the
constitutional freedoms and criminal law guarantees in times of crisis. In this
contribution, we concentrate on a special aspect, which is, however, on the
whole illustrative of these fundamental questions. The question of what role
the information gathered by intelligence services can and may play in the
criminal proceedings has become topical in the investigation, prosecution
John A.E. Vervaele
7 This was also attempted after 11-S , but without much success. 
8 COM (2004) 221 final, 29 March 2004. 
9 Communication de la Commission au Conseil et au Parlement Européen, Vers un renforcement de
l’accès à l’information par des autorités responsables pour le maintien de l’ordre public et pour le
respect de la loi, COM (2004) 429 final, 16 June 2004 (only French version at the time of
writing). 
10 Draft Framework Decision on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law
enforcement authorities of the Member States of the EU, in particular as regards serious offences
including terrorist acts, Council of the EU, 10215/04, 4 June 2004. 
132
and trial of suspects and accused of terrorist offences. After 11-M, a counter-
terrorism taskforce was established at Europol7 with the aim of collating,
analysing and enhancing information from intelligence and police services.
At the end of March 2004, the European Commission submitted a draft
third-pillar proposal concerning exchange of information and cooperation
to combat terrorism.8 More important for our topic is the Communication
from the Commission concerning enhancement of access to information by
law enforcement agencies9 and the Swedish proposal for a Framework
Decision concerning the exchange of intelligence between the enforcement
authorities of the Member States.10 The Commission Communication has as
its starting point mutual recognition and free movement of information
between the competent authorities of the Member States. Police work and
judicial activity should also be based more on intelligence. In passing,
without any further explanation, it is remarked that the intelligence services
could play an important role in this. The Swedish proposal works out in
greater detail what is stated in the Communication from the Commission,
but as regards the topic under discussion it keeps all options open. The basic
idea is indeed the free movement of information between the competent
enforcement authorities. A competent authority is a: ‘national police,
customs or other authority, that is authorized by national law to detect,
prevent or investigate offences or criminal activities and to exercise authority
and take coercive measures in the context of such activities’. Such a broad
definition does not exclude national intelligence services. The definition of
‘information and intelligence’ is also quite broad: ‘any type of existing
information or data (...) that could be used in crime investigation or a
criminal intelligence operation to detect, prevent or investigate a crime or a
criminal activity’. This means that intelligence from the intelligence services
also falls within its scope. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the
broad definitions have to ensure that free movement is not frustrated by
differences in national organization. With respect to our topic is concerned,
Article 1 (objective and scope) hastens to determine expressly that the
Framework Decision does not imply any obligation to exchange information
to be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. In the event that the
receiving state wishes to use that information in this way the prior consent
of the providing state is required and it may be necessary to go down the
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road of judicial assistance. On the other hand, the Framework Decision does
not prohibit use as evidence either, nor does it restrict it by setting certain
conditions as to selection or legal protection. The usefulness is determined
exclusively by the provider. In accordance with Article 9(4), the provider of
information may set certain conditions with respect to its use. The conditions
are not defined further, although Article 9(3) makes it clear that the purposes
of use are determined quite broadly, ranging from prevention to
prosecution, and for trying offences, but also for enforcing migration rules,
for example. It is notable that the various proposals all pay lip service to the
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the legal protection of
the suspect, but that this dimension is not fleshed out in concrete terms. 
The discussion in the EU Member States on the use in criminal proceedings
of information gathered by intelligence services already dates from before
11-S. That such information can be used as a lead for initiating criminal
investigations is hardly contested. Much more of a problem is, however,
whether this information per se is able to give rise to reasonable suspicion
or form a sufficient basis for the use of coercive measures under criminal
law. It is also disputed whether such information can be used as legal proof
in criminal proceedings. The question in the event of its use is also what the
consequences are for the public nature and the position during the trial of
the defence. In most countries there is little case law concerning this question
and the discussion, both academic and practical, has yet to get into stride. 
This article aims to contribute to this discussion by giving a legal analysis of
the problem in the US and in the Netherlands. Much experience has been
gathered in the US in the field of intelligence sharing between intelligence
and police services. There is also some interesting case law available,
including Supreme Court decisions. The Netherlands is one of the few
countries in the EU where the topic has become the focus of political scrutiny
by the government and the parliament since the beginning of the 1990s11 and
has also led to case law and legislative proposals. Do the intelligence
services12 have a discretionary power to determine which intelligence will
be provided? What is the relationship between this discretion of the
intelligence services and the corresponding legal duty of secrecy on the one
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hand and the rights of the defence and the judicial review of the lawfulness
of that information? Can criminal prosecutors blindly trust the discretionary
judgment of the intelligence services and the lawfulness of the means by
which the information has been gathered? Is it up to the prosecuting
authorities to decide whether such intelligence is used as secret evidence?
After 11-S, these questions have been partly at issue in a number of Dutch
criminal cases. The Rotterdam District Court’s decision at the end of 200213
where it was held that intelligence may serve as a lead in criminal
investigations, but not as the exclusive basis for determining reasonable
suspicion has been heavily criticized in the US.14 By an expedited procedure,
Minister Donner has submitted a legislative proposal concerning shielded
witnesses.15 Does this mean that the paradigm of security doctrine has
further eroded the classic embeddedness of criminal law in the rule of law?
Is the use of secret intelligence evidence an example of the Americanization
of Dutch criminal (procedural) law? The comparison with the US is
interesting, as precisely in the US much experience has been gained over the
past 20 years in conducting the movement of information between
intelligence and police services. It is also especially the US which urges
European authorities to bring about a smoother flow of information within
Europe. However, the comparison between the US and Europe requires a
few words of explanation concerning the historical context of the
cooperation between the intelligence and police services. 
2. INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (IC) AND THE 
LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY (LEC):
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The intelligence services have the task of recognising, based on a strong
position of information, future or current threats to the democratic legal
order and to alert the competent authorities thereof. The police, in the
framework of its judicial function, have the task of gathering information
concerning offences with a view to their eventual settlement by a criminal
court. The intelligence services do not have the objective of investigating
Terrorism and information sharing
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offences, while the police do not have the objective of gathering information
in order to ensure a strong position of information. The tasks which the
different services have been set and the manner in which they perform them
are quite different and a dividing wall has been erected between the two.
Information of intelligence services is principally secret. Police information
is subject to judicial testing as criminal evidence in the publicly accessible
courtroom. 
Nevertheless, the historical distinction has to be viewed in perspective, as
both the intelligence services and the police services are not ancient
institutions and furthermore their relatively young existence has been
politically marked. The turbulent political developments explain the
differences in the relationship between intelligence and police services in the
US and Europe. In Europe, the experience with the totalitarian regimes and
their political police forces in Nazi Germany, in Russia, etc. has greatly
influenced the organization after WW II. The intelligence services went back
to being separate organizations with their own statute. The police were
removed from direct political control and made into an agency, and
operational police duties and intelligence work were formally split up. In
principle, information was no longer to be shared. Attempts after 11-S to
revise this flow of information, for example in the framework of Europol’s
Counter Terrorism Task Force have ended in fiasco. In the US, the political
threat at home and abroad was exactly the argument inducing President
Roosevelt to expand the FBI from a classic federal police service into an
organization with a dual function, namely to act as a federal police service
and a federal intelligence service, initially just limited to national security,
but later also endowed with tasks abroad, despite the establishment of the
CIA which was specialized in this area. In short, in the US it is not exactly
sensational that the regular federal police do not just occupy themselves
with investigation, but also with intelligence work, including counter-
intelligence operations. For this reason, the IC in the US not only consists of
the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and
the National Reconnaissance Office, but also of the intelligence units of the
Department of State, of the FBI, of the Department of Treasury, of the
Department of Energy and of the armed forces. The fact that there is no
organizational division between the IC and the LEC – both the CIA and parts
of the FBI belong to the IC – is not to say that there are no strict distinctions
in respect of objectives, methods and control. Both evidently have to act in
accordance with the Constitution and federal laws, but it is obvious that the
IC is much more regulated by executive orders from the President and is
only subject to political parliamentary control. Due to the scandals which
occurred in the 1970s over political espionage, the relationship between the
IC and the LEC remained factually frozen for a decade, but starting from the
mid-1980s cooperation was resumed, due to the fact that Presidents Ford
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and Reagan assigned special tasks to the IC by executive order in the fight
against drugs and terrorism. Certainly after 11-S and the mounting criticism
heaped onto the intelligence services counter-terrorism cooperation has
intensified considerably.
3. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN
THE IC AND THE LEC UP TO 11-S 
3.1. THE DEVELOPMENT TOWARD SECURITY-ORIENTATED
CRIMINAL LAW
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, searches and tapping and
surveillance operations are being carried out without a judicial warrant, also
for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting criminal offences. Since the
1960s, judicial control over the use of powers of investigation has been a
recurring theme in the case law of the Supreme Court, especially as regards
the Fourth Amendment (warrant clause). The Fourth Amendment expressly
states that a warrant can only be issued when there is probable cause. In Katz
vs. US,16 the Supreme Court decided that a warrant is needed for bugging,
unless a matter of national security is involved. In Berger vs. New York,17 the
Supreme Court stated that the warrant for wiretapping must be sufficiently
specific with respect to the target, the method and the duration. In 1986, the
legislator regulated this topic in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Street Act. The conditions for obtaining a warrant are laid down in
legislation. The enforcement agencies must be able to show probable cause18
in an affidavit.19 As a rule, therefore, a warrant is required, but there are
numerous exceptions.20 In case of tapping without a warrant, however, the
action taken may not be unreasonable and there must be probable cause in
the mind of the investigating officer. The Act also expressly states that ‘the
statute does not limit the constitutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts by foreign powers, to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the US, or to
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protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities’.21
In short, tapping without a warrant is always possible in national or
international investigations for the purpose of protecting national security.
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided in Keith22 that the Constitution makes a
warrant compulsory if the investigation concerns ‘domestic individuals’ and
has ‘no significant connection with a foreign power’. The legislator got the
message and in 1978 the by now infamous FISA surveillance23 was
introduced, which makes it possible to bug and tap foreign powers and their
agents, foreign networks or persons or terrorist activities24 without a
warrant. For the tapping or bugging of related US citizens or US residents
a warrant must be issued by a secret FISA court. The investigative acts
involved are always secret and persons concerned are not informed of them
either before or afterwards. 
3.2. INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN THE IC AND THE LEC
BEFORE 11-S
In the US, the discussion concerning the transfer of intelligence for use as
criminal law evidence mainly focuses on FISA intelligence. Nevertheless, the
principles are the same for information obtained from classical intelligence
operations. First of all, the compulsory notification by the IC has to be
pointed out. For example, the FBI, if it involves itself with foreign
intelligence (FI) or foreign counterintelligence (FCI), must immediately
inform the Criminal Division of the Attorney General’s Office (AG) when
‘facts or circumstances are developed in an FI or FCI investigation that
reasonably indicate that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may
be committed’. This threshold is below the probable cause requirement in
criminal cases. The crimes concerned are serious and include terrorism and
material support to terrorism. When FISA is involved, the Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review of the Department of Justice must be
consulted beforehand. In case of doubt or disagreement the final decision is
made by the AG.25 The other way around, the procedure for access by
criminal prosecutors to IC information in ongoing criminal investigations is
also strictly regulated. The prosecuting authorities must indicate quite
precisely the information related to facts and individuals which it wishes to
access and why. The permission of the Internal Security Section of the
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Criminal Division of the Attorney General’s Office is required. Furthermore,
the officials of the Public Prosecutor’s Office who will inspect the documents
have to be screened beforehand for reliability.
Sec. 1806 and Sec. 1825 of the FISA Act include specific provisions
concerning the use of FISA intelligence as evidence in criminal cases. The
permission of the person concerned is not required, but he/she does have
to be informed. The permission of the AG is always required, implying that
information cannot be shared directly between the IC and LEC. The person
concerned may request the court in the preliminary stage or at the hearing
to declare the evidence inadmissible for having been unlawfully obtained or
because the procedural requirements applicable in FISA investigations have
not been fulfilled. The AG may request the court by means of an affidavit
under oath to hear the case in camera and ex parte if disclosure of the
evidence would harm national security.26 
In transferring IC information to the LEC mandatory use must be made of
what is termed the minimization procedure.27 Minimization aims to limit the
acquisition, retention and dissemination of information concerning US
citizens as much as possible. Only where such information is crucial for the
assessment of foreign intelligence may it be stored and used. It is also
provided that evidence of criminal offences which have been committed, are
being committed or may be committed are exempted from minimization. A
classic component of minimization is the information-screening wall, which
means that an official from the Department of Justice, who is not directly
involved in the IC or the LEC, screens the FISA intelligence and only selects
the parts that are relevant as evidence. The starting point of the 1995
memorandum by AG Janet Reno28 is the prohibition of any direct exchange
of information between the IC and the LEC. All information has to pass
through the Criminal Division first for screening. The transfer of information
is possible whenever there is a ‘legitimate and significant criminal law
enforcement concern’. The Criminal Division may also assist the FBI in order
to preserve the option of criminal prosecution, although ‘the Criminal
Division shall not, however, instruct the FBI on the operation, continuation,
or expansion of FISA electronic surveillance or physical searches.
Additionally, the FBI and Criminal Division should ensure that advice
intended to preserve the option of criminal prosecution does not
inadvertently result in either the fact or appearance of the Criminal
Division’s directing or controlling the FI or FCI investigation toward law
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enforcement objectives’.29 In short, the 1995 memorandum principally allows
the use of FISA intelligence in criminal case. US courts also allow the use of
FISA intelligence as evidence in criminal cases, provided, of course, that
FISA requirements have been fulfilled and that the information has not been
laundered. In many court proceedings it has been attempted to declare the
fruits of FISA surveillance as unlawful evidence, but to no avail, given that
the prevailing opinion in case law is that the FISA rules form a
constitutionally sound balance between the rights of the defence and the
interests of national security, which renders the use of FISA intelligence as
legal evidence in criminal cases lawful.30
In addition, the 1995 memorandum restricts contact between the IC and the
LEC by providing for steering by the Department of Justice and the AG (also
known as the chaperone requirement) and by the reporting duties which
have to be open for testing by the FISA court. Especially in complex cases,
such as, for instance, the bombings of US embassies in Africa, the FISA court
performed such testing. The FISA court’s task in this is: ‘to preserve both the
appearance and the fact that FISA surveillances and searches are not being
used sub rosa for criminal investigations’ and has ‘routinely approved the
use of information screening ‘walls’ proposed by the government in its
applications’.31 However, it has emerged from a recent memorandum
opinion of the FISA court that in 75 cases information submitted by the FBI
or the Department of Justice has proved to be erroneous, omitted or false in
applications for the extension of secret judicial authorization for secret
tapping operations or searches, without this having been sufficiently
explained by the organizations in question.32 By this, the FISA court
recognizes that the screening wall was deliberately circumvented. 
3.3. BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS OF PERSONS
INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
In 1980, the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) was adopted
under regular federal criminal procedural law. Essentially, it is decided in
a pre-trial conference, in camera, what information will be used during the
hearing, while a protective order (secrecy) is imposed on the defence which
has access to the information. The government may also ask the court not to
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make the secret evidence available, but to replace it with summaries of or
excerpts from the reports. To this end, the government must convince the
court that this will not undermine the position of the defence. In case the
court refuses, the AG may contest the disclosure by means of an affidavit. If
the court nevertheless persists in disclosure and the government fails to
respond to the court’s subpoena, the court may exclude the evidence or take
these circumstances into account in sentencing. CIPA primarily aims to
prevent secret information from still leaking out at the trial or placing the
government in the dilemma of either disclosing or withdrawing the
evidence. There is much debate in the US concerning the relationship
between CIPA and the constitutional freedoms. 
There is not much case law in the US concerning unlawfully obtained
evidence with respect to evidence in criminal proceedings which relies on
information derived from intelligence. Reference is routinely made to
Truong,33 but this case dates from before the FISA Act. Truong was suspected
of espionage for Vietnam and pending criminal investigations was tapped
without a judicial warrant by the FBI and the CIA. The evidence that was the
result of the tapping was excluded. Nevertheless, Truong was still convicted,
as there was also evidence relying on intelligence gathered against agents of
a foreign power at a time when there was not yet a suspect or a criminal
investigation. This case is an indication of the fact that courts have to be
watchful for circumventions of the legal guarantees through the deployment
of intelligence surveillance by another route. 
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4. INFORMATION SHARING BETWEEN THE IC AND
THE LEC AND THE NEW APPORACH UNDER THE
PATRIOT ACT
4.1. THE PROVISIONS OF THE PATRIOT ACT34
After 11-S, new anti-terrorism legislation was elaborated in the US, resulting
in the USA Patriot Act.35 First of all, it has to be emphasized that the Patriot
Act has considerably expanded the regular powers of investigation,
especially in the field of electronic and digital surveillance, while at the same
time it has weakened judicial control. Secondly, the Patriot Act has ensured
that FISA security criminal law can be used on a much wider scale. Before
the Patriot Act, a primary purpose standard had to be met, which meant that
in the case of an investigative interest the use of FISA powers was only
allowed for primary foreign intelligence purposes. The Patriot Act has made
it sufficient that the purpose is significant. It is allowed to pursue
investigative purposes, as long as a significant purpose of the surveillance
is to obtain foreign intelligence information.36 Thirdly, the Patriot Act has
opened up the flow of information from the LEC to the IC and vice versa by
breaking down the existing legal dividing wall. Sec. 203 of the Patriot Act
amends the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.37 Sec. 203(a) grants the
LEC permission to share information from criminal investigations derived
from matters occurring before the Grand Jury with other federal agencies
(such as the Immigration Service) and the intelligence and security services,
in case the information is of an FI or FCI character. Sec 203 (b) also grants the
LEC permission to share criminal investigative electronic, wire and oral
interception information with other federal agencies and the intelligence and
security services, in case the information is of an FI or FCI character. Neither
requires judicial authorization. In this way, the CIA is increasingly gaining
control over the use of FISA. The Patriot Act provides that the director of the
CIA may elaborate regulations for the collection of information under the
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FISA and that he may assist the AG so as to ensure that the FISA information
is used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence work.38 Based on
Sec. 905(a) and Sec. 905(b) of the Patriot Act further rules were specified in
memoranda of the Attorney General’s Office of September 2002.39 Specific
Memoranda of Understanding, which have not been published, have also
been negotiated between the services involved. 
 
Sec. 504, conversely, regulated the flow of information from the IC to the
LEC. The FBI intelligence services which are authorized to use the secret
FISA tapping powers are allowed to consult with the LEC in order to
coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against attacks, hostile acts,
sabotage, international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities by a
foreign power, agent, network or person. This means that the Patriot Act
neither prohibits nor conditions this flow of information. Matters have been
further elaborated in the recent NSI guidelines from the AG for FBI national
security investigations and foreign intelligence collection.40 These do not
leave any doubt that FI or FCI, either obtained through FISA or not, may be
used in the investigation and prosecution of serious offences, such as
terrorism. It becomes clear from the guidelines that the FBI has a duty to
inform other components of the IC and the competence to inform the LEC.
If the information is not personal, it may be supplied at all times. If it is
personal, the information has to be necessary to guarantee the safety of
persons or property, to prevent crime or ‘to obtain information for the
conduct of a lawful investigation by the FBI’. The IC and the LEC may also
consult with a view to coordinating their different tasks. 
4.2. FURTHER REGULATION BY THE AG CONCERNING
INTELLIGENCE SHARING
In the Patriot Act’s wake, AG Ashcroft issued a new memorandum in March
2002 concerning intelligence-sharing procedures for foreign intelligence and
foreign counterintelligence investigations conducted by the FBI,41 which is
to replace the 1995 memorandum. In the field of information-sharing powers
the memorandum distinguishes between disseminating information and
providing advice. Under the dissemination of information clause42 the LEC
is given access to all FI and FCI information, unless the FISA court or the AG
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imposes restrictions. This access also concerns personal information and
modus operandi. The FBI has a duty to inform the Criminal Division of the
Attorney General’s Office concerning FI and FCI information ‘that is
necessary to the ability of the US to investigate or protect against attack,
sabotage, terrorism, and clandestine intelligence activities’. The wording has
thus been broadened as compared to the 1995 memorandum. The use as
evidence in criminal proceedings of FI or FCI information requires
permission of the AG. Under the provision of advice clause far-reaching
cooperation procedures are established concerning coordination between the
IC and the LEC in areas such as investigation strategy, the use of coercive
measures by the IC and the LEC, interaction between the IC and the LEC
and ‘the initiation, operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA searches or
surveillance’. The latter were still expressly excluded in the 1995
memorandum. Finally, the possibilities for forwarding IC and FCI
information directly to lower levels within the Public Prosecutions Office are
enhanced considerably, although the Criminal Division of the Attorney
General’s Office still has to be notified and the AG still has to approve the
use of the information as evidence in criminal proceedings. The outcome of
these provisions is that the prosecuting authorities are given an important
role in the management of secret FISA tapping surveillance and searches,
from the very beginning to the inclusion of the results in the criminal file.
Due to the considerable broadening of the scope of application of the FISA
and thereby of secret investigative acts little threatens to remain of the classic
criminal law guarantees against coercive measures. 
These facts have not escaped the notice of the FISA court which formally has
to approve the memorandum.43 Because of its years of experience with FISA
authorizations, the court is fully aware of the fact that IC and LEC
investigations may overlap or that FI/FCI and investigative interests may
overlap within the same FISA surveillance or regular criminal law
investigations. According to the FISA court, AG Ashcroft’s extensive
interpretation of the provisions of the Patriot Act do not constitute a
reasonable balance between the intelligence purposes of FISA and the rights
and freedoms of the citizen. The FISA therefore rejects the competence of
criminal prosecutors to give guidance to FBI intelligence in respect of ‘the
initiation, operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA searches and
surveillance’ and thus also rejects the direct access of criminal prosecutors
to IC information: ‘A fair reading of those provisions leaves only one
conclusion - under sections II and III of the 2002 minimization procedures,
criminal prosecutors are to have a significant role directing FISA
surveillances and searches from start to finish in counterintelligence cases
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having overlapping intelligence and criminal investigations or interest,
guiding them to criminal prosecution (...) If criminal prosecutors direct both
the intelligence and criminal investigations, or a single investigation having
combined interests, coordination becomes subordination of both investigations
or interests to law enforcement objectives’. The FISA court fears that the
stricter requirements and broader legal guarantees of regular criminal
procedural law will be circumvented by means of the FISA, which is why it
has deleted these passages and replaced them with wording that is in line
with the 1995 memorandum. The FISA court does, however, approve of the
clause concerning the movement of information and applies the
minimization procedure to it in order to prevent information concerning US
citizens from ending up with the investigative authorities. This decision is
remarkable on two accounts. The FISA court is known as a loyal government
ally and for this reason is sometimes laconically called ‘rubber stamp’. This
time, however, it pulled the government up short and moreover published
its opinion. 
The AG has appealed44 to the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review, which is unique in history. It is interesting to note the positions
chosen by the AG in defence of the memorandum. The starting point is that
the Patriot Act enables a complete exchange of information between the IC
and the LEC. The information-screening walls are torn down. FISA
surveillance may be used for serious offences, including terrorism, in order
to obtain criminal law evidence: ‘Prosecution of spies and terrorists is not
merely an incidental by-product of a FISA search or surveillance; rather,
obtaining evidence for such a prosecution may be the purpose of the
surveillance; the use of FISA within those investigations, may be ‘designed’
for a law enforcement purpose’. The AG does not hesitate to make clear that
due to the Patriot Act a primary intelligence purpose is no longer needed
from now on and that a significant intelligence purpose suffices. FISA
surveillance means that the FISA may be used primarily for a law
enforcement purpose. The former dichotomy between the IC and the LEC is
history, according to the AG, who adds that another consequence is that
comparisons no longer have be made between the interests of the IC and
those of the LEC and that it therefore no longer needs to be determined
whether the legal guarantees under criminal law play a role either. In other
words: out with the Truong test (no IC surveillance after suspicion). This is
also the reason why the screening walls and the chaperone requirements
may be abolished. In its first decision in its 23 years of existence, the Court
of Review has reversed the decision of the FISA court and approved
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Ashcroft’s 2002 memorandum after all.45 The Court is of the opinion that the
FISA legislation was never intended to limit the use of IC intelligence in
criminal proceedings and that the 1995 memorandum was therefore a much
narrower interpretation than was legally necessary. The Court is further of
the opinion that the Truong test is based on an erroneous starting point.
Whenever there is a case of criminal suspicion and criminal investigation,
this does not mean that policy interests with respect to foreign intelligence
just cease to exist. The construction in Truong was based on the organic
division within the Department of Justice and erected a dividing wall
between the components. According to the Court, this interpretation belies
the fact that effective counterintelligence consists of a combination between
the IC and the LEC and therefore requires their cooperation: ‘A standard
which punishes such cooperation could well be thought dangerous to
national security (...) Indeed, it was suggested that the FISA court
requirements based on Truong may well have contributed, whether correctly
understood or not, to the FBI missing opportunities to anticipate the
September, 11, 2001 attacks’. On the other hand, the Court rejects the opinion
of the AG that the dichotomy between the IC and the LEC has ceased to exist
and that FISA can be used for primary enforcement purposes. Nevertheless,
this does not result in a different outcome, given that the Court holds
significant purpose to mean that there must be a significant FI or FCI
purpose; for this, it is immaterial how significant the investigative purpose
is, nor does it require a comparison anymore. Only in cases where there is
no significant FI or FCI purpose, would there be insufficient grounds for
FISA surveillance. NGOs and the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers have submitted amicus curiae briefs in which it was argued that the
2002 memorandum constitutes a violation of various constitutional
guarantees, among which the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. To
the question of whether abandoning the primary purpose requirement for
FISA surveillance constitutes a violation of the Constitution the Court
laconically replies that, after a thorough examination of the case law: ‘We
acknowledge, however, that the constitutional question presented by this
case has no definitive jurisprudential answer (...) Even without taking into
account the President’s inherent constitutional authority to conduct
warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance, we think the procedures and
government showings required under FISA, if they do not meet the
minimum Fourth Amendment warrant standards, certainly come close. We,
therefore, believe firmly, applying the balancing test drawn from Keith, that
FISA as amended is constitutional because the surveillances it authorizes are
reasonable’.
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4.3. EQUALITY OF ARMS AFTER 11-S?
The far-reaching possibilities for criminal prosecutors to use intelligence as
evidence in criminal proceedings and also to direct the process of obtaining
intelligence naturally raises questions as to the position of the defence. Many
of these points were already reviewed under 3.3. A question which became
extremely topical after 11-S is whether the suspect/accused may also use FI
or FCI as evidence in criminal proceedings in order to prove his innocence.
One of the problems involved is that the government uses its constitutional
prerogatives to shield information.46 That this issue can lead to extremely
complex situations in the US may best be illustrated by the case concerning
Zacarias Moussaoui,47 a French national of Moroccan birth who was
detained in August 2001, i.e. before the attacks, on suspicion of a breach of
immigration law. At that time, he was taking flying lessons. After the
attacks, he was connected with Al-Qaeda and the terrorist acts of 9/11.
Moussaoui is accused of being the twentieth hijacker whose detention
prevented him from boarding and of being jointly guilty of the death of 3000
people. He has pleaded not guilty, and is risking the death penalty on four
of the six charges against him.48 For this reason, he wishes to have Bin Al-
Shibh questioned as a witness. The problem is, however, that Bin Al-Shibh,
who was arrested in Pakistan, is suspected of being the intermediary
between Moussaoui and the 9/11 command and is being held as an enemy
combatant overseas, presumably in Guantánamo. His statements are
classified and can therefore not be contested. Both the District Court and the
US fourth Circuit Court of Appeals have recognized Moussaoui’s Sixth
Amendment right to subject the witness Bin Al-Shibh to questioning, as one
of the fundamental rights of a fair trial.49 In this case, District Court Judge
Brinkema in January 2003 ordered that the testimony be recorded on video
and that the video be made available to the jury or that the witness be heard
by teleconference. AG Ashcroft continued to underline the fact that this
would result in ‘the unauthorized disclosure of classified information’. The
AG refused to implement the court decision, which was formally confirmed
in a secret affidavit in mid-July 2003.50 The court could hold the government
in contempt of court, but could also declare the Moussaoui case
inadmissible, exclude part of the evidence or instruct the jury unfavourably
for the government, preventing a death sentence. Judge Brinkema opted to
exclude the death penalty and to strike the part of the indictment related to
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9/11, as in her view there could be no fair trial under these circumstances.
The part of the indictment concerning conspiracy to commit the Al-Qaeda
actions remained intact. The government lodged an appeal against the
decision with the US 4th Circuit Court of Appeals,51 which is known to be
conservative, and which on 22 April 200452 decided to set aside the exclusion
of evidence and of the possibility of a death sentence. On the other hand, the
three-judge panel also decided that Moussaoui could not be deprived of the
right to question detained Al-Qaeda members as witnesses and that he was
entitled to present their testimony to the jury. Judge Brinkema was ordered
to elaborate a compromise which would allow the witnesses to be
questioned in a way which would not prejudice their questioning by the
government in the framework of the war against terrorism.53 On March 2005
The Supreme Court54 rejected Moussaoui’s attempt to directly question Al-
Qaeda prisoners and cleared the way for a trial of the only US defendant
charged in connection with the September 11 attacks. The ruling allows the
government to proceed with plans to seek the death penalty if Moussaoui is
convicted of participating in an Al-Qaeda conspiracy that included the 2001
airplane hijackings. In April 2005 he suddenly decided to plead guilty to all
six counts of conspiracy to engage in terrorism.55 It is not excluded that he
did so in order to avoid transfer to a military procedure and thus military
consignment.
4.4. INTERIM CONCLUSION
Already before 11-S there was much room in the US for letting intelligence
flow through to criminal proceedings. FISA security criminal law has
promoted this development. Before 11-S the minimization procedure and the
chaperone requirements had to ensure that personal information concerning
US citizens was only used in criminal proceedings if they were relevant as
evidence for the prosecution. In addition to the screening walls, it was also
guarded against that the investigative authorities did not direct the secret
surveillance in their own interest. It was clear, however, that secret
intelligence information from criminal investigations could be interesting,
not just as leads in criminal investigations, but also as evidence. All this has
led to complex legal structures concerning secret evidence and the secret
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furnishing of proof in ex parte and in camera proceedings and in a number
of cases even to secret trials and secret judgments. After 11-S the security
paradigm has further eroded the classical criminal law guarantees. Secret
investigations and the free flow of the information derived therefrom into
criminal proceedings have become possible. The administration of criminal
justice is becoming less and less public and the decision making concerning
the acquisition and use of evidence takes place within an ever wider margin
of discretion. National security is the government’s argument not to apply
the legal guarantees which are perceived as obstacles. This has led to legal
action on principle concerning the applicability of the constitutional
guarantees in the fight against terrorism. To what extent is the Netherlands
prepared to learn from the experiences in the US? 
5. ANALYSIS OF THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE
AND INVESTIGATION INFORMATION IN
THE NETHERLANDS
5.1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Netherlands has a long tradition of obtaining, storing and processing
criminal intelligence.56 Criminal Intelligence Services [Criminele
inlichtingendiensten (CIDs)], which have now been renamed Criminal
Intelligence Units [Criminele inlichtingen eenheden (CIEs)], have the task of
providing information in the context of the performance of police functions
in the field of serious and/or organized crime. Much intelligence is supplied
by informers, civilian infiltrators and tip-offs and stored in CIE files. In 2003,
for example, an additional CIE was established at the law enforcement
agency of the Internal Revenue (FIOD-ECD).57 Intelligence may of course
also be provided by the General Intelligence and Security Service [Algemene
Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD)] or the Military Intelligence and
Security Service [Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD)], which
obtain information by information gathering and processing and through the
use of special powers. Under the Intelligence and Security Services Act [Wet
op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (Wiv 2000)] the AIVD’s power to
snoop has been extended considerably, also in the field of the integrity of
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public administration and threats to computer networks. Articles 19 to 33 of
the Wiv provide for far-reaching tapping and searching powers, infiltration,
etc., which are to be as effective as the special investigative measures
provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Despite the fact that the AIVD
does not have the power of judicial investigation (Article 9(1) Wiv) and that
police officers who perform tasks for the AIVD are not allowed to carry out
their criminal investigative powers in that capacity (Article 9(2) Wiv), the
AIVD from an information-gathering point of view can certainly compete
with the police and judicial authorities. Article 14 Wiv stipulates that the
storing of AIVD information must be strictly separated from the CIE. The
stronger the AIVD’s position of information is, the more interesting it
becomes for the Public Prosecutions Department to allow this information
to flow through and perhaps also direct the acquisition of such information.
Based on Article 62 Wiv, the police has the duty to supply information
which is relevant for the intelligence services. The police may also at the
request of the AIVD supply information in accordance with Article 17 Wiv
and Article 15(2) of the Police Files Act [Wet op de politieregisters]. The
provision of information by the AIVD to internal and external channels is
phrased in the Wiv as a competence and takes place in the framework of a
closed provision regime. The AIVD may, for instance, disclose information
to the Public Prosecutions Department in case it has information which may
be relevant to the investigation or prosecution of offences (Article 38 Wiv).
The AIVD, as opposed to the police, is under no obligation to do so, and will
only do it to prevent threats to vital national interests.58 Remarkable is the
lack of any provision based on which the police or the Public Prosecutions
Department could request information from the intelligence and security
services of their own accord. The transfer of AIVD information takes place
through two national terror officers of the national public prosecutor’s office
in the shape of an official report. The report does not reveal sources or
describe the modus operandi. Based on Article 38(3) Wiv, the officer is
competent to inspect the underlying documents in order to verify the
correctness and lawfulness of the facts reported. He decides whether the
information is supplied to the public prosecutor handling the case in
question through an ex officio report of the national police (KLPD), possibly
after consultations with the Board of Procurators General (Article 61(2) Wiv).
Both the AIVD officers and the public prosecutor handling the case are
bound to secrecy (Articles 85-86 Wiv), extending to the trial.
John A.E. Vervaele
59 Kamerstukken II 2002/3, 27 925, no. 82. 
60 Kamerstukken II 2001/2, 27 925, no. 10. 
61 In the Netherlands, exchange of information has been much experimented with, e.g. as
between the financial supervisory authorities, the Public Prosecutions Department, the
police, the tax authorities and the AIVD, among others in the field of fighting the financing
of terrorism. See ‘Nota Integriteit financiële Sector en terrorismebestrijding’, Kamerstukken
II 2001/2, 28 106, no. and M.J.J.P. LUCHTMAN, E.A., Informatie-uitwisseling in het kader van het
Financieel Expertise Centrum, Utrecht, 2002, ISBN 90-73272-32-7. 
150
On 6 January 2003 the interdepartmental working group on legislation
concerning information exchange published a report concerning Information
Exchange and the Fight against Terrorism59 to implement point 43 of the
Action Plan on Security and Fighting Terrorism.60 The report argues in
favour of thematic files to complement the serious crime file (CIE file) and
the preliminary and temporary files. The information in the thematic files
could be stored for five years and its use would be less limited. The report
does not pay any attention to the use of this information in criminal
proceedings. In practice, this transfer of information is institutionalized. The
Board of Procurators General has drawn up Guidelines for information
supply to and from the AIVD and MIVD [Handleiding informatieverstrekking
aan en door de AIVD en MIVD]. Intelligence and information from criminal
investigations are submitted to the Technical Evaluation Commission, now
renamed Evaluation Consultation [Evaluatie Overleg], which is a committee
of representatives of Ministries (the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence) and
operational services (KLPD, AIVD and MIVD).61 The Unit for Fighting
Terrorism and for Special Tasks [Unit Terrorismebestrijding en Bijzondere
Taken] of the KLPD’s Criminal Investigations Service [Dienst Recherche
Onderzoeken] carries out threat analyses and the AIVD carries out analyses.
However, the information supplied by the AIVD for the purpose of these
analyses may not be used by the police for operational purposes or
investigation purposes. The outcomes of the analyses are discussed in the
Evaluatie Overleg and recommendations are made to the Evaluation Triangle
[Evaluatie Driehoek] consisting of the Directorate General for Public Order
and Security [DG Openbare Orde en Veiligheid] of the Ministry of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations, the Directorate General for Law Enforcement [DG
Rechtshandhaving] and the Special Directorate General for Security and Crisis
Management [Project DG Beveiliging en Crisisbeheersing], both of the Ministry
of Justice. The ultimate responsibility lies with the Security Council [Raad
voor Veiligheid], which has been established as a sub-council of the Council
of Ministers. It is assisted by the Joint Committee for Combating Terrorism
[Gezamenlijk Comité Terrorismebestrijding], consisting of representatives from
the civil service and the Public Prosecutions Department. The flow of
information is therefore much more directed than would appear from the
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legislation and analysis and operational information is easily mixed.
Research by the Netherlands Court of Audit has meanwhile shown that the
KLPD’s organization of information concerning terrorism still leaves much
to be desired.62 How do the Dutch criminal courts interpret the balance
between the protection of national security and the corresponding
confidentiality of sources, identities, modus operandi on the one hand and
the public administration of criminal justice and the corresponding legal
protection of the suspect on the other?
5.2. THE USE OF AIVD INTELLIGENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: QUID JURIS?
On 18 December 2002, the three-judge criminal section of the Rotterdam
District Court rendered a remarkable judgment63 in a case in which persons
whom the press qualified as the Dutch branch of Al Qaeda were suspected
of forgery under ordinary law and of acts in preparation or support of
terrorist activity (attacks on the American embassy in Paris and/or an
American army base in Belgium). The charges were based on two official
reports of the BVD, the AIVD’s predecessor, which had obtained
information by continuous surveillance and by the use of an
informer/infiltrator. Now that sources and modus operandi are not
disclosed, it was impossible to verify whether the information was the BVD’s
own or whether it had been supplied by a foreign sister organization. In this
case the question therefore arose whether the Public Prosecutions
Department could regard the suspect as a suspect as referred to in Article
27(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure based on the information supplied
by the BVD to the Public Prosecutions Department alone. The District Court
answers this question in the negative, now that the gathering of intelligence
by the security service did not take place in the context of criminal
investigations – which as such are subject to criminal law guarantees – for
the purpose of gathering evidence incriminating the suspect, but instead
took place in the framework of the duties assigned to the service under the
Wiv, which is the gathering of intelligence for the purpose of national
security. The District Court considered that the legislator intended the strict
separation of intelligence gathering for the purpose of national security and
the investigation and prosecution of offences. It therefore held that although
the intelligence could be used as a lead to initiate criminal investigations it
could not serve as the exclusive basis for meeting the requirements of the
concept of suspect under Article 27(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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The District Court did not decide to declare the case inadmissible, but to
exclude the evidence and then to acquit the accused due to lack of evidence.
The Court added that even without the exclusion of evidence the case would
have resulted in an acquittal now that insufficient basis had been provided
for the charge of preparing an attack. 
In a similar case of 31 December 2002 concerning a petition for termination
of the pre-trial detention, the Rotterdam District Court sitting in camera
reached a different conclusion.64 The Court considered the testing of the
official reports by the national public prosecutor, even if only marginal, a
sufficient guarantee to accuse a suspect in accordance with Article 27(1) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure based on AIVD intelligence. The decision
was not reasoned any further. On 17 January 2003, this judgment was
upheld on appeal by the Hague Court of Appeal sitting in camera.65 The
official reports were considered sufficient grounds for a reasonable suspicion
of guilt as referred to in Article 27 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or for
a reasonable suspicion that organized offences are being committed or
plotted as referred to in Article 132a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now
that the source of information may be any third party, including the AIVD,
and the information therefore does not necessarily need to originate in the
framework of criminal investigations in which criminal law guarantees
automatically apply. The information does, however, have to yield sufficient
concrete facts or circumstances to justify charging. 
On 25 April 2003, the Hague Court of Appeal rendered a precedent-setting
interlocutory decision as a result of counsel’s petition for the hearing of
witnesses, the addition of files to the case file and the making available of a
CD-rom of tapped telephone conversations.66 The whole case revolved
around official BVD reports and the way in which the information was
obtained. To what extent can the acquisition and supply by the BVD of
intelligence be made subject to judicial control? The Court emphasized that
the duty of secrecy under the Wiv is a legal duty which also applies to the
provision of information to the judicial authorities. Waiver of the duty of
secrecy is only possible by a joint decision in writing of the Ministers of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Justice. Given the
political control of the permanent parliamentary Committee on intelligence
and security services and the supervisory committee established under the
Wiv 2002 and the strict separation which the legislator intended of the
supervision of intelligence duties on the one hand and criminal justice duties
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on the other, the Court found that the testing of the lawfulness of the
acquisition of information that had been supplied to the judicial authorities
by the AIVD could only be limited: ‘It shall have to be limited to cases in
which there are strong indications that the information has been obtained
through (gross) violations of fundamental rights. To that extent the Court is
of the opinion that a good faith principle should apply in the relationship
between the (now) AIVD and the judicial authorities in the same way as this
applies in extradition law and treaty-based judicial assistance in criminal
matters, which implies that the judicial authorities may assume that the
information supplied by the BVD/AIVD has at least been obtained
lawfully’.67 The Court still added, however, that in addition to assessing
lawfulness, the evaluation of the information should also take account of its
content, especially when this information could be used as evidence in court:
‘If the trial is to be fair, (…) the court (…) at some point will have to consider
carefully to what extent this information may be regarded as legal
evidence’.68 
On 5 June 2003 the three-judge section of the Rotterdam District Court
decided an interesting similar case, clearly inspired by the interlocutory
decision of the Hague Court of Appeal. Based on official BVD reports,
criminal investigations were started, searches were made and persons were
arrested in two cases. Afterwards, the information was carelessly compiled,
so that it could no longer be verified which acts had been performed in
which case. The three-judge section was of the opinion that judicial
authorities may in principle assume that information supplied by the AIVD
has been lawfully obtained. Only where (gross) violations of fundamental
rights appear to have occurred should the principle of good faith between
the judicial authorities and the AIVD be deviated from. In the case in
question, there had been carelessness, but no gross violations. The District
Court was also of the opinion that the intelligence could result in a
reasonable suspicion of guilt as referred to in Article 27 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and thereby reached the opposite conclusion from the
one arrived at in the District Court decision of 18 December 2002. However,
the District Court had some difficulty assessing the evidence in the
framework of a fair trial, given the duty of secrecy of the AIVD and the
national public prosecutor, which makes it impossible to make statements
concerning the source of the information. According to the Court, this makes
it impossible for the defence to test the origin and factual correctness of the
official reports and the Court adds: ‘the Court cannot find any support in the
law for a different way of reasoning, which would stipulate that as the
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seriousness of the offence of which the suspect has been accused increases,
the evidence collected for the purpose of proving the offence needs to meet
fewer requirements’. This led to the exclusion of evidence and acquittal.
On 21 June 2004, the three-judge section of the Hague Court of Appeal
rendered a judgment on appeal against the judgment of the three-judge
section of the Rotterdam District Court of 18 December 2002.69 The Court
largely followed the reasoning in the interlocutory decision of 25 April 2003.
The starting point is the principle of good faith. Unless there is manifest
doubt (concerning (gross) violations of human rights) the Court does not
have any duty to test. The legislator has compartmentalized the powers of
the AIVD on the one hand and of the judicial authorities on the other. This
strict separation does not, however, mean that the AIVD would have to
stand back if the judicial authorities start an investigation (or take other
action). It does mean that the AIVD and the judicial authorities must keep
on exercising their powers exclusively with a view to carrying out their own
functions ‘and it is not appreciated, for instance, that the judicial authorities
circumvent the boundaries which have been imposed on its own
investigative powers by letting the BVD exercise its powers for the purpose
of the criminal investigation and subsequently having the outcome of this
included in the criminal proceedings through the national public prosecutor
for terrorism.’70 The conclusion is that AIVD intelligence cannot just serve as
leads, but may also contain facts or circumstances which produce a
reasonable suspicion of guilt as referred to in Article 27 of the Code of
Criminal Code, or a reasonable suspicion as referred to in Article 132a of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court of Appeal does not discuss the
question of the circumstances under which this information could be used
as evidence, because the evidence was supported by other evidence. Appeal
in cassation has meanwhile been lodged against this decision. 
It emerges from this analysis of case law that the initial decision of the
Rotterdam District Court has not survived. It is now accepted in case law
that AIVD intelligence can be used not just as a lead to initiate criminal
investigations, but that the facts and circumstances it contains can also
produce a reasonable suspicion of guilt. It also emerges from the case law
that courts are extremely cautious in deciding to regard AIVD information
as legal evidence, the more so because there are grave doubts as to the
possibilities for the defence to test the correctness of this information. The
duty of secrecy from the Wiv and the marginal testing by the courts will in
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practice often lead to unfair trials. It is therefore not surprising that, despite
the case law, it has still been decided to intervene legislatively. 
5.3. THE DONNER BILL CONCERNING THE USE OF
AIVD INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Justice Minister Donner has long defended that amendments to the
legislation were not necessary to solve the problem and had promised
parliament an extensive Note on the matter. However, partly under pressure
from parliament the Minister revised his position and on 29 April 2004 the
cabinet approved a legislative proposal. 
The Bill centres around three themes: the non-disclosure by the examining
magistrate of certain information in the interest of national security; the
hearing of witnesses as shielded witnesses and an amendment of the law of
criminal evidence. The government has rejected and reasoned its rejection
of the advice of the Council of State on a number of essential issues. 
5.3.1. Preventing disclosure of certain information
(Art. 187d Code of Criminal Procedure) 
In the Netherlands witnesses in criminal cases have a duty to appear and
give testimony (Art. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). There are
exceptions to this main rule, however. Based on Article 293 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the court can allow witnesses not to answer questions
that are not relevant to the case or that may work to the witness’s
disadvantage and the examining magistrate has the power to exclude
answers to questions from the hearing report (see Arts. 187 et seq. and the
rules concerning threatened witnesses). It is also possible that certain
personal details concerning the witness are not disclosed in connection with
nuisance or obstacles to his/her profession, thus providing for limited
anonymity. It is proposed to extend the provisions of Article 187 with a view
to the hearing of witnesses where the interest of national security is at stake.
In this way, details of the modus operandi may be kept secret. This not to be
made public information is subsequently kept out the case file and is not
disclosed to the Public Prosecutions Department, the suspect/accused,
counsel or the trial judge. This also means that certain answers to questions
by the defence will not be revealed to the parties either. 
5.3.2. (Anonymous) shielded witness
(Arts. 226g-226m Code of Criminal Procedure)
A separate procedure, ex parte and in camera, is introduced for the shielded
witness. Like the threatened witness, the shielded witness does not have to
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appear at the hearing anymore either. The decision is taken by the
examining magistrate at the request of the Public Prosecutions Department,
the suspect, the trial judge or ex officio. The possibility of hearing the
witness anonymously has also been provided for, namely in case disclosure
of the witness’s identity could endanger the witness him/herself or national
security. The examining magistrate him/herself, however, must be aware of
the witness’s identity. If possible, the hearing shall take place in camera, but
not ex parte. This means that the parties to the proceedings may be present
and that the witness is disguised or shielded. It is assumed in the legislative
proposal that as a rule such hearings will not only take place in camera, but
also ex parte, which means that the parties are only allowed to have
questions asked and cannot be present. The report of the hearing is only
submitted to the parties with the consent of the witness. Further to the
report, the parties may ask further questions. The report may only be added
to the case file with the consent of the shielded witness. This implies a break
in the examining magistrate’s monopoly to assemble the case file. 
5.3.3. Law of criminal evidence (Art. 344 Code of Criminal Procedure)
Official AIVD reports may from now on serve as legal evidence in criminal
proceedings and not just as documents which may only serve as evidence in
connection with the contents of other evidence. This rule is also extended to
documents from foreign investigating officers and officials in the service of
international institutions. The new rule does not alter the assessment of
evidence by the courts. Furthermore, the principle that a suspect/accused
cannot be convicted solely on the basis of his/her own testimony (Art. 341(4)
Code of Criminal Procedure) and the rule that convictions may not be based
on the testimony of one witness alone are maintained. In addition, further
evidence is required to support statements from anonymous, shielded
witnesses. 
5.3.4. Advice of the Council of State and government position
In its expedited advice the Council of State enumerates a number of essential
points of criticism. The Council states that this regulation does not
necessarily make ‘hard’ information, i.e. usable in criminal proceedings, out
of ‘soft’ information. The government holds that the rules precisely aim to
test hard information without endangering national security. The Council
also argues in favour of an in principle in camera, although not ex parte
organization of the procedure for questioning the shielded witness, namely
from the point of view of the principle of immediacy. The government
agrees, but underlines that this situation will mostly be the exception rather
than the rule. The interests of national security will in practice nearly always
lead to ex parte procedures. The Council further criticizes the partial
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cancellation of the examining magistrate’s exclusive competence in the
compilation of the case file. The Council pleads against granting the witness
the right to consent. The government does not agree and argues that ‘with
respect to making a decision to hear a witness as a shielded witness, it
cannot be asked of the examining magistrate that he makes an assessment
on the merits as to whether the interest of national security requires it. He is
not in a position to do so’.71 The Council also has doubts concerning the
amendments to the law of evidence as to what constitutes legal proof. The
current minimum standard of evidence, especially with regard to AIVD
official reports, may, given the limited possibilities for control, actually serve
as a guarantee, according to the Council. The government distances itself
from this point of view. Finally, the Council is of the opinion that the test of
lawfulness does not receive sufficient attention. Thereto, the government
underlines the significance of the principle of good faith. 
Due to the fact that the procedure was expedited the Dutch Public
Prosecutions Department was not consulted. However, it has recently
emerged during the discussion of the Bill in Parliament that the Public
Prosecutions Department has severely criticised the proposal in a letter to
the Minister.72
6. THE ECHR AND THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
At first glance, the ECHR is only of limited relevance, now that it is
established case law that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
does not decide on the admissibility of evidence and whether information
constitutes legal evidence, as this is regarded as a matter of national law, but
only deals with the question of whether the procedure in its entirety,
including therefore the collection and use of evidence, fulfils the
requirements of a fair trial.73 Of course, the ECtHR has on occasion tested the
use of evidence at trial, for instance, with respect to the anonymous witness
as the exclusive source of evidence.74 The Court has also rendered judgments
concerning the use of certain investigative techniques in connection with
violations of, for example, Article 8 ECHR. From this it follows that judicial
control may be ex parte, but ‘(...) that it is essential that the procedures
established should themselves provide adequate and equivalent guarantees
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safeguarding the individual’s rights (...) The rule of law implies, inter alia,
that an interference by the executive authorities with an individual’s right
should be subject to an effective control which should normally be assured
by the judiciary, at least in last resort, judicial control offering the best
guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper procedure’.75 As
regards our topic of discussion, the case law of the ECtHR has dealt with
two interesting aspects: 1. the legal testing of intelligence which forms the
basis for reasonable suspicion, and 2. the use of secret evidence in ex parte
procedures. 
The basis for suspicion and arrest and judicial control have been the subject
of various IRA cases. In Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. UK76 the question is
whether, and if so, which information the authorities have to disclose in
order to enable a test of the lawfulness of the arrest in the event that it was
based on confidential intelligence. In the UK, reasonable suspicion is no
longer required for terrorist offences and a lower threshold, that of genuine
and bona fide or honest suspicion, now applies. Further, a concrete
indication of the offence which is suspected to have been committed no
longer needs to be given either. The ECtHR is aware that in the case of
terrorism intelligence is often used that cannot be made public, not even in
a court of law, without endangering the source. The Court is also
understanding of the view of the UK that the practical definition of the term
reasonable suspicion may depend on the type of crime, but immediately
adds: ‘Nevertheless, the exigencies of dealing with terrorist crime cannot
justify stretching the notion of ‘reasonableness’ to the point where the
essence of the safeguard secured by Article 5(1)(c) is impaired (...).
Nevertheless, the Court must be enabled to ascertain whether the essence for
the safeguard afforded by Article 5(1)(c) has been secured. Consequently, the
respondent Government has to furnish at least some facts or information
capable of satisfying the Court that the arrested person was reasonably
suspected of having committed the alleged offence. This is all the more
necessary where, as in the present case, the domestic law does not require
reasonable suspicion, but sets a lower threshold by merely requiring honest
suspicion’. In this case, the facts were not furnished by the UK and the Court
decided that there had been a violation of Article 5(1)(c). From a later
decision in Murray v. UK,77 however, the Court does accept that, despite the
lower threshold for suspicion in the Northern-Irish anti-terrorism legislation,
the requirements for reasonable suspicion were nevertheless fulfilled, as this
emerged from additional facts and circumstances. The facts and
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circumstances in question were derived from the court decisions in the civil
damages suit which Murray had started against her arrest. In O’Hara v. UK,78
where the claimant had been arrested on suspicion of terrorism based on
statements by four informers, the ECtHR also held that the requirement of
reasonable suspicion was fulfilled. In this case, the reasonable suspicion (not
the honest suspicion) was based on statements by four separate informers.
The reasonable suspicion was tested by three different UK courts, which in
itself is a guarantee against arbitrary arrest. The suspect in these trials did
not make use of his right to call into the question the good faith of the police
officers who made the arrest. The reasonableness of any suspicion depends
on the circumstances of each individual case. In this case, the circumstances
put forward result in reasonable suspicion. In his dissenting opinion, judge
Loucaides states that here must be a reasonable suspicion in the minds of the
enforcement authorities at the moment of arrest and they have to be able to
furnish proof of this upon judicial control. These criteria were not met in this
case. In Chahal v. UK79 the ECtHR clearly states that the protection of national
security by the use of secret evidence does not render judicial control
inoperative: ‘The Court recognizes that the use of confidential material may
be unavoidable where national security is at stake. This does not mean,
however, that the national authorities can be free from effective control by
the domestic courts whenever they choose to assert that national security
and terrorism are involved’.80 Panels without judicial competence are an
insufficient guarantee. 
In the UK, the use of intelligence as evidence in criminal cases is principally
subject to the classic rules of evidence. Under common law, the prosecution
has a duty to disclose to the defence all evidence which supports the position
of the accused. However, the Attorney General’s Guidelines from 1981 made
the duty to disclose subject to a discretionary power of the Crown
Prosecution Service to withhold sensitive information (national security,
identity of an informer, etc.). In this, the Crown Prosecution Service must
seek a balance between the measure of sensitivity and the significance of the
evidence to the defence. If the result would be a very serious violation of the
rights of the defence, the case will just have to be dismissed. UK Courts of
Appeal have rendered many decisions on this issue. In R. v. Ward (1992)81 it
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was held that it is up to the court, not the prosecution, to weigh the interests.
In R. v. Davis, Johnson and Rowe (1993)82 the Court of Appeal developed three
options for the procedure of testing: 1. the test takes place in ordinary
adversarial criminal proceedings where only the type of material is
indicated, or 2. the test takes place in an ex parte procedure, where the type
of material is not disclosed (secret information), or 3. the test takes place in
an ex parte procedure, which is not disclosed to the defence as its disclosure
would reveal the nature of the evidence (secret information and secret
procedure). In R. v. Turner (1994)83 the Court of Appeal warns that R. v. Ward
has led to too many requests for disclosure of confidential evidence: ‘We
wish to alert judges to the need to scrutinize applications for disclosure of
details about informants with very great care (...) Even when the informant
has participated, the judge will need to consider whether his role so
impinges on an issue of interest to the defence, present or potential, as to
make disclosure necessary’. The ex parte procedures have resulted in several
cases before the ECtHR. In Jasper v. UK84 the person concerned was kept
under observation, tapped and subsequently arrested on drug charges on
the basis of intelligence. The prosecution applied for non-disclosure of the
evidence based on public interest immunity. The defence was informed of
the application and the ex parte hearing, but was not given any information
concerning the sources and means of evidence and was not informed of the
court’s reasoning either. The ECtHR emphasized the importance of the free
exchange of evidence between the parties, but also recognized that the right
to disclosure of evidence is not an absolute right and may conflict with other
interests, such as national security, the protection of witnesses and of sources
of evidence, modus operandi, etc. The Court accepts secret evidence
provided that this limitation of the rights of the defence ‘be counterbalanced
by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities (equality of arms)’. In
the case in question, the Court was of the opinion that this balancing had
been successful, now that the furnishing of proof had been tested by the trial
judge and because the secret information was not part of the case file, but a
lead obtained from a phone tapping operation.85 In a collective dissenting
opinion, six magistrates sharply protested against this decision and argued
that the fact that the defence was not informed concerning the type of
evidence and material and the fact that the outcome of the ex parte
procedure was not reasoned were contrary to the nature of adversarial
proceedings to such an extent that this could not be rectified by the trial
judge. In Edwards and Lewis v. UK,86 a drug case where use was made of
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agents provocateurs, a similar ex parte procedure was applied in which the
defence was not informed of the type of evidence. However, in this case the
material in question was used as evidence at the trial. Moreover, the
undercover police officer, who was the only witness called during the
hearing, was questioned anonymously. It was crucial for the defence to be
able to verify whether this constituted entrapment by the police. It also
emerged at the trial that intelligence had been submitted in the ex parte
procedure concerning the accused’s involvement in drug offences in the past
without the defence having been notified of this so that they could have
contested these facts. In this case the Court established a violation of Article
6(1). This was also the outcome of Dowsett v. UK87 as the trial judge had
failed to perform the necessary judicial control and this could not be
remedied on appeal.88 How important this judicial control is also becomes
clear from Tinnelly & Sons and others and McElduff and others v. UK,89 a case
in which it was decided, based on intelligence, to reject a tender in a public
procurement project in Northern Ireland. The applicants were refused public
work contract or the security clearance necessary to obtain those contracts
on account of their religious beliefs or political opinions. The refusal was
based on a certificate, being conclusive evidence, from the Secretary of State
relying on intelligence. The ECtHR holds that the lack of independent and
full scrutiny by a judicial authority violates art. 6 ECHR. 
7. CONCLUSION
From the comparative law analysis (USA, the Netherlands, UK and ECHR)
it clearly emerges that the use of intelligence in the administration of
criminal justice touches upon the foundations of a fair trial and can therefore
not be reduced to a detail of criminal prosecution. The public administration
of criminal justice90 is essential to the legality of the dispensation of justice
as a public matter. The internal public nature of criminal justice proceedings
requires that the participants in the proceedings may be present in the
performance of acts of procedure or that they are informed thereof, that they
have access to the evidence and that they can have this evidence tested in a
fair trial. The external public nature of the proceedings requires that cases
are not heard ex parte and in camera. Exceptions to this public nature, both
internal and external, are of course conceivable, not in the least in the interest
John A.E. Vervaele
162
of the suspect/accused or witnesses, but also in the interest of national
security. The ECtHR not only accepts that information from intelligence
services may be used as a secret lead for criminal investigations, but also that
this intelligence is able to produce a reasonable suspicion of guilt. These
exception must, however, be defined in such a way that it is not the
discretionary power of the intelligence services and/or the enforcement
bodies to decide on the use of secret evidence under criminal law.
Experience in the US has shown that the screening walls and the chaperone
requirements are necessary filters in the movement of information between
the intelligence services and the investigative authorities. According to the
ECtHR, the decision concerning the use of secret information as the basis for
suspicion or as evidence in criminal cases must be subject to independent
judicial control whereby the court must be competent to assess the
lawfulness and reliability of the information and the sources. In my view, the
starting point here cannot be an assumption of lawfulness and reliability and
marginal judicial testing. However, it is not appropriate to speak of the free
movement of information in this context either. The principle of good faith
between the AIVD and the investigative authorities as elaborated by the
Hague Court of Appeal – no testing, unless there are indications of the
(gross) violation of human rights – must also be considered a dangerous feat
of reasoning. Belief in the reliability of the AIVD as a partner (such as exists
between nations in the case of extradition) is not the essential factor, but the
rule-of-law function of the courts with respect to secret evidence that the
suspect/accused is by definition unable to assess. In short, in a fair trial,
judicial control is a fundamental counterbalance against the restriction of the
rights of the defence. The idea that the court would be unable to perform any
testing or only marginal testing due to the fact that the legislator desired the
compartmentalization of the relationship between the AIVD and the
criminal justice authorities is untenable. Information flow has to be
accompanied by judicial information control. How important judicial testing
is becomes clear from the Classified Information Procedures Act which has
been elaborated as part of the federal law of criminal procedure in the US
and from the case law of the ECtHR. Testing the lawfulness of the
intelligence evidently also concerns the possible direction of the gathering
of information by the AIVD. The possibility must be guarded against that
the AIVD, either in cooperation with police and judicial authorities or not,
employs its far-reaching secret powers of investigation for the main purpose
of criminal law objectives and in so doing circumvents the guarantees of
criminal justice. Parallel investigations are conceivable, but information
laundering - whereby information is produced by a different body than the
one which gathered it - wrapped in the veil of confidential sources and the
duty of secrecy under the Wiv is not allowed. So far, the powers under the
Wiv have only been used in the Netherlands for strengthening the position
of information and the possible additional yields of surveillance, i.e.
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information which could also be of interest to the criminal justice authorities.
The discussion in the US concerning the difference between primary and
significant intelligence purpose indicates that the use of Wiv powers also for
criminal justice purposes cannot be reduced to mere additional yields. The
court exercising judicial control must also have the power to order
disclosure of the evidence. If this is refused, the prosecution may still
withdraw the evidence or dismiss the case. This means that the Donner Bill
still leaves some issues for regulation. The duty of secrecy under the Wiv has
to be reviewed in respect of the supply of information to the judicial
authorities and the test before the court. The filters between the AIVD and
the judicial authorities have to be formalized. Furthermore, the conditions
under which the defence may compel the prosecution and the AIVD to
submit secret evidence in criminal proceedings require regulation. 
A second point of interest is the organization of the procedure for judicial
control itself. In many cases, judicial control cannot be exercised at a public
hearing, but often not in camera and inter partes either. The opportunity for
the defendant and his counsel to inspect documents or directly question
incriminating witnesses is therefore limited or non-existent. In the interest
of national security the rights of the defence can be limited, provided that
sufficient compensatory measures are taken. The Donner Bill formulates
rules under which the examining magistrate is informed of all relevant facts
and gives a reasoned assessment of the reliability of the information
supplied. The examining magistrate has a duty to investigate the reliability
of the statement (person, circumstances, etc.) and a duty to reason his/her
decision. The question is, however, whether the examining magistrate can
qualify as an independent and impartial court. The Bill restricts
investigations into the lawfulness of the information to exceptional cases of
gross violations of human rights in the acquisition of the information. As a
starting point, the principle of good faith applies. Investigations into the
reliability of the information are also marginal in character, judging from the
Explanatory Memorandum: ‘with respect to making a decision to hear a
witness as a shielded witness, it cannot be asked of the examining magistrate
that he makes an assessment on the merits as to whether the interest of
national security requires it. He is not in a position to do so’.91 Appeal
against the examining magistrate’s decision to apply the procedure for the
shielded witness is also ruled out, as ‘this is connected with the marginal
character of the evaluation framework: the decision whether to grant
shielded witness status will often solely depend on rather objective criteria
for assessment (whether the person in question is in the service of the AIVD,
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what his/her function is, etc.)’.92 The fact that the shielded witness
determines whether the hearing report is submitted to the parties or whether
it is added to the case file (double consent of the shielded witness)
undermines the independence and impartiality of the examining magistrate.
Also important in the conduct of a fair trial is the degree to which the trial
judge has reasoned the use and reliability of the evidence. The Explanatory
Memorandum states that the trial judge may always freely assess the
findings of the examining magistrate, but in fact the information needed for
this at his/her disposal is quite limited. The proposed rules make the trial
judge too dependent upon the examining magistrate. As opposed to under
the general rules for protecting witnesses, the trial judge cannot order the
shielded witness to appear at the hearing. The prosecution can prevent the
giving of testimony at the hearing. The trial judge does not have access to all
the sources used by the examine magistrate either. He does not have access
to non-public material. In testing reliability and lawfulness, the trial judge
has to rely completely on the marginal assessment of the examining
magistrate. 
The third and final point concerns the evidentiary quality of and the extent
to which AIVD intelligence can serve as legal evidence. On this point, there
is no decisive ECHR case law. The procedure and rules proposed in the
Donner Bill concerning legal proof run parallel to the regulation of the
procedure involving the anonymous witness in the Code of Criminal
Procedure.93 It has become clear from ECHR case law concerning the
anonymous witness94 that convictions may not rely to a decisive extent on
anonymous information. The degree to which supporting evidence is needed
depends on the degree to which the right to question is limited. In the case
of AIVD intelligence, these limitations will mostly be considerable, implying
a by definition limited role for this evidence in criminal proceedings.
Provisions that AIVD evidence cannot be exclusive evidence do not meet the
ECHR standard. Of further relevance here are Articles 344(a) and 344(3) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 344(3) provides that an anonymous
written statement may not be used as evidence, unless the ruling on the
evidence is to an important degree supported by other evidence and the
accused has not claimed the right to hear the witness. If, however, the
accused has claimed this right, the statement may be regarded as testimony
in accordance with Article 295 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the
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minimum rules of Article 344a must be respected at all times. This means
that this is only possible for serious violations of legal order and on the
condition that the witness has been heard by the examining magistrate, in
accordance with the rules concerning the threatened witness in Articles
266(c) to 266(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
It remains to be seen whether the Donner Bill, which was inspired by the
rules concerning the anonymous witness, will be able to pass the ECHR test.
The Explanatory Memorandum is non-committal in this respect: ‘Following
the procedure for the shielded witness does not guarantee that this means
that the requirements of Article 6 ECHR are adequately met under all
circumstances. Every criminal case conducted in accordance with the
proposed rules will in addition have to be tested (by the court) against the
treaty provision referred to’.95 It is also questionable whether these rules do
not undermine the so urgently desired separation between the functions of
the intelligence services and those of the investigative authorities. There is
a risk that from now on, in cases touching upon national security, marginal
standards will be set with respect to the use of information obtained by the
AIVD by means of investigative powers which are comparable to the powers
of the investigative authorities. It is also important that the European
proposals assuming the free movement of information between the
intelligence services and the investigative authorities are critically examined.
The comparison with US law demonstrates the significance of filters in the
movement of information and of judicial control. Neither Europe, nor the
Netherlands seems to have sufficiently learned the lesson implied. In any
case, the fight against terrorism cannot serve as an argument to undermine
sub rosa the foundations of the rule of law and the public administration of
criminal justice. Sub lege libertas.
 
